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ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la on the
Advaita Vedånta Theory of a Self
James Duerlinger,
Binita Mehta,
and Siddharth Singh ∗
Introduction
ÍåntarakΣita was an important 8th century CE Indian
Buddhist philosopher1 who introduced Indian Buddhism to Tibet
and is believed to have created what the Tibetans call the YogåcåraSvåtantrika School of Madhyamaka Indian Buddhism, which
combines the Madhyamaka and Yogåcåra philosophies with the
logic and epistemology of Dharmak¥rti. 2 He composed (i)
Madhyamakålaµkåra (Ornament of the Middle Way), 3 (ii)
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1

An excellent introductory explanation of the philosophy of Íåntarakṣita is that
of James Blumenthal’s "Íåntarakṣita" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (fall 2009 edition). See the bibliography for further sources.
2
Madhyamaka philosophy was first systematically presented by Någårjuna
(third century CE) in the Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakaßåstra)
on the basis of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (Prajñåpåramitåsūtra-s).
The Yogåcåra philosophy was first systematically presented in the fifth
century CE by Vasubandhu and his brother, Asa∫ga. The logical and epistemological ideas Íåntarakṣita incorporates into his philosophy were
formulated by Dharmak¥rti in the seventh century CE.
3
There are at the present time two translations of the Ornament of the Middle
Way into English. The first is included in The Ornament of the Middle Way:
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Madhyamakålaµkårav®tti (Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of
the Middle Way), (iii) Vådanyåya†¥kå Vipañcitårthå (Commentary
on [Dharmak¥rti's] Debate Reasoning (Vådanyåya), a Full
Explanation of the Meaning), 4 and (iv) Tattvasaµgraha
(Compendium of Reality), which is a comprehensive critical
examination of the major Indian philosophical theories in India.
Kamalaß¥la was ÍåntarakΣita’s most important disciple who wrote a
commentary on the Tattvasaµgraha (Compendium of Reality)
entitled Tattvasaµgrahapañjikå (Commentary on the Difficult
Points of the Compendium of Reality), which we shall call the
Commentary.5 Since the Commentary both includes and explains
the Verses of ÍåntarakΣita’s Compendium, in what follows we
translate and briefly comment upon the Commentary discussion of
ÍåntarakΣita’s examination in Verses 328–335 of the Advaita
Vedånta theory of self (åtman).6
A theory of self, in the full form it took in India, is a theory
in which the ontological status of that to which the first-person
singular pronoun in fact refers is explained, 7 arguments for the
theory are presented, objections to alternative theories are put
forward, replies are made to objections to the theory, and the
A Study of the Madhyamaka Thought of Íåntarakṣita, by James Blumenthal
(Snow Lion Publications: Ithaca, 2004) and the second is included in Speech
of Delight, Mipham’s Commentary on Íåntarakṣita’s Ornament of the
Middle Way by Ju Mi-pham, translated by Thomas Doctor (Snow Lion
Publications: Ithaca, 2004).
4
There seems to be at the present time no English translation of Dharmak¥rti’s
treatise and Íåntarakṣita’s commentary on it. The Sanskrit text for both is
edited by Radula Så∫k®tyåyana in Dharmak¥rti’s Vådanyåya with the
Commentary of Íåntarakṣita (Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies,
Sarnath, 2007); originally published in the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa
Research Society: New Series 21–22 (1935–1936).
5

The only translation of the Commentary into English presently available is by
Ganganatha Jha, entitled The Tattvasaµgraha of Íåntarakṣita with the
Commentary of Kamalaß¥la (Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi, 1986).

6

The Sanskrit text translated here is in The Tattvasaµgraha of Ócårya
Íåntarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikå’ of Shri Kamalaß¥la, critical
edition by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, in two volumes (Bauddha Bharati:
Varanasi, 1968).
7
Although in the Nyåya, Advaita Vedånta and perhaps in the Såµkhya schools a
self is not said to be the object of the first-person singular pronoun, but this
characterization of a self does not seem to be inconsistent with their
characterizations.
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consequences for us entailed by the theory are elaborated. A self
may be defined as that to which reference is in fact made when the
first-person singular pronoun is used to refer.
Advaita Vedånta Theory of a Self
Advaita Vedånta (hereafter simply “Advaita”) is a Hindu
philosophical school based on an interpretation of the UpaniΣads.
The generally acknowledged principal exponent of the Advaita
philosophy is Ía∫kara (early 8th century CE), whose most basic
Advaita treatises are his commentaries on the Brahma SËtras of
Bådaråyana, the Bhagavad Gitå and the UpaniΣads. Our references
below will be to the works of Ía∫kara.8
In his examination of the Advaita theory of a self
ÍåntarakΣita assumes that the Advaitins distinguish a self to which
the first-person singular pronoun ultimately refers from a self that
is used to refer to an individualized ego, which is a false self that
identifies itself with the body and mind (antaḥkaraˆa). In this
summary the first self we shall represent as “the Self” and the
second simply as “a self.”
In Advaita, it is taught that Ultimate Reality is
indestructible, auspicious, all-pervading, undivided or partless, and
devoid of action.9 The Self is the same as Ultimate Reality. Though
the Self is our very self, we ordinarily remain unaware of it
because of our ignorance. In dependence upon this ignorance,
persons confuse their Self with their bodies and minds and
experience themselves as individualized egos distinct from
everything else. The self suffers in cyclic existence (saµsåra)
because of this ignorance (avidyå) of being one with the Self.
Enlightenment, which is the complete realization of ourselves as
the Self or Ultimate reality, is the recognition of what we already
are.10 So the realization of the Self is the removal of the erroneous
8

The beginnings of Advaita Vedånta, however, extend back at least to
Gaudapada.
9
See Ía∫kara’s Upadeßa Såhasr¥ II.8.2–3, translation by A.J. Alston in The
Thousand Teachings of Ír¥ Ía∫karåcårya (Upadeßa Såhasr¥) (London:
Shanti Sadan, 1990). Alston prepared his translation after consulting S.
Mayeda’s (1979) translation.
10
One argument that Ía∫kara advances in favor of the notion of the Self derives
from an analysis of deep sleep.
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view of ourselves through right knowledge.11
Knowledge of the Self takes the form of an immediate
intuition (anubhava) that transcends subject-object duality. It is not
possible to step outside of the Self to observe it as an object in a
distinctive mode. Knowledge of the Self leaves no differentiation
between one’s self and the Self; it entails the state where the whole
of existence is experienced as the Self that is without a possessor or
object. In the ordinary waking state and in the dream state, which
are characterized by the absence of the knowledge of the Self, our
experiences are based on the subject-object duality. In ignorance,
reality presents itself as the empirical world of determinate entities.
To understand the nature of the transformed vision, it is
necessary to analyze briefly the relation between Ultimate Reality
and the empirical world. The Ultimate Reality is the self-existent
substratum of the empirical world, which does not constitute a
reality distinct from the Ultimate Reality. Ía∫kara says that
As the spaces within pots or jars are non-different from the
cosmic space...so it is to be understood that this diverse
phenomenal world of experiences, things experienced, and so on,
has no existence apart from Brahman.”12

According to the Advaitins, the empirical world, which is
neither existent by itself nor without existence, is an appearance
(måyå) or manifestation of Ultimate Reality. 13 The error of an
unenlightened person consists in viewing the empirical world as
exhausting the whole of reality and in failing to be aware of
Ultimate Reality as its substratum. An enlightened person, on the

11

See B®hadåraˆyaka Upaniṣad Bhåṣya I.4.7, translation by Mådhavånanda in
The B®hadåraˆyaka Upaniṣad with the commentary of Ía∫karåcårya
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1950 (3rd ed.)).

12

See Brahma Sūtra Bhåṣya II.1.14, translation by Gambh¥rånandans in Brahma
Sūtra Bhåṣya of Ír¥ Ía∫karåcårya (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1977 (3rd ed.)).

13

Måyå is also the phenomenal world of duality as apprehended in ordinary
perception, when the mind still operates in the state of ignorance; see
Ía∫kara’s commentary to Gauḍapåda’s Kårikå III.19, translation by
Nikhilånanda in The Måˆḍūkya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapåda’s Kårikå and
Ía∫kara’s Commentary (Kolkata: Advaita Ashram, 2006 (8th impression)).
It must be noted that unlike many later Advaitins, Ía∫kara does not equate
ignorance (avidyå) and måyå.
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other hand, does not see duality, though seeing it. 14 This
paradoxical statement seems to mean that the one who has
achieved perfect knowledge of Ultimate Reality or the Self
experiences empirical qualities but does not consider them to be
absolute characteristics of objects. An enlightened person denies
the ultimacy of the multiplicity that characterizes the empirical
world. He realizes that there is no distinction between the Self and
the objects in terms of their fundamental reality and in this sense
his experience of reality is non-dual.
The Theory of a Self According to ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la
ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la are practitioners of Måhåyåna
Buddhism, according to which Buddhists strive to become
Buddhas for the sake of helping all sentient forms of life become
free from the sufferings of cyclic existence. For this purpose, both,
great compassion (måhakarËˆa) for those who suffer and wisdom
(prajña) are needed on the path to Buddhahood. For those who, like
ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la, follow the Madhyamaka philosophy,
the wisdom needed on the path is knowledge of “dependent coorigination” (prat¥tyasamutpåda), which is the middle way
between the extremes of independent existence and no existence at
all. ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la believe that the “ultimate reality”
(paramårthasatya) of all phenomena is their “emptiness” (ßËnyatå),
which is their “essential nature” (svabhåva) of not existing by
themselves, independent of anything else. The chief reasoning
ÍåntarakΣita uses to establish that phenomena do not independently
exist is to argue that they cannot be one or many.15
Like
his
Mådhyamika
predecessors, Någårjuna,
Bhåvaviveka and Candrak¥rti, ÍåntarakΣita avoids the consequence
that phenomena do not exist at all by making their dependent co14

See Upadeßa Såhasr¥ II.10.13; translations by A.J. Alston. The Thousand
Teachings of Ír¥ Ía∫karåcårya (Upadeßa Såhasr¥) (London: Shanti Sadan,
1990). Alston prepared his translation after consulting S. Mayeda’s (1979)
translation.

15

This is often called the neither-one-nor-many argument. In the first verse of
the ninety-seven verse The Ornament of the Middle Way Íåntarakṣita in
effect says that no phenomena independently exist because in reality they
are, like a reflected image, neither one nor many, and in the next sixty
verses he puts the phenomena asserted by his Buddhist and non-Buddhist
philosophical opponents to the test of the neither-one-nor-many argument.
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origination their “conventional reality” (saµv®tisatya). But unlike
his Mådhyamika predecessors he combined the Madhyamaka
theory of the ultimate reality of all phenomena with the theory that
by convention dependently co-originating phenomena are “mind
only” (cittamåtra) in the sense that they are of the nature of
“consciousness” (vijñåna). 16 Such phenomena are conventionally
real, ÍåntarakΣita believed, because they are objects of knowledge,
causally efficacious, impermanent, and can be shown to lack
independent existence.17 From the Yogåcårins he accepts not only
the mind-only thesis, but also the thesis that consciousness is aware
of itself along with its awareness of its object, which is itself of the
nature of consciousness.
The conceiving of a self, according to ÍåntarakΣita, causes
us to suffer in cyclic existence because its conception creates as its
object a self that falsely appears to exist by itself and we cling to
this false appearance. 18 Freedom from suffering basically arises
when practitioners engage in protracted meditation on the lack of a
self’s independent existence. Buddhahood is attained when
practitioners complete the nine stages of the path of meditation
which are explained in the DaßabhËmikasËtra (Discourse on the
Ten Stages [of the Path of Meditation]), according to which it is the
lack of the independent existence of all phenomena that is the
object of meditation.
ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la use brief arguments against the
Advaitins’ theory of a self because they seem to believe that the
only serious philosophical difference between their theory of a self
and their own is the Advaita ascription of permanence to a self.19
The verses in what follows belong to ÍåntarakΣita and the
commentary on them belongs to Kamalaß¥la.
16

By contrast the Yogåcårins believed that only phenomena that are mind
independently exist.

17

See verses sixty three and sixty four of the Ornament of the Middle Way.

18

If Íåntarakṣita holds the traditional view concerning the cause of our suffering
in cyclic existence, he believes that it is clinging to the false appearance of
the independent existence of the self conceived in dependence upon the
presence of the aggregates that causes us to suffer, not clinging to the false
appearance of the independent existence of consciousness that causes us to
suffer.
19
See Verse 330 in the Commentary. This does not mean that this is their only
error, but that it is the principal error in their theory of a self.
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TRANSLATION
Those who espouse the Advaita system of philosophy
and are followers of the UpaniΣads think that a
self 20 is permanent, one and of the nature of
consciousness, which appears in the form of the illusory
modification of earth and the like. This is the view set
forth in the following Verses:
Verse 328
Others claim that earth, fire, water and the like are the
illusory modification of
a permanent cognition21 and that this is what constitutes
a self.
“This is what constitutes a self” means that a self is of
the nature of one permanent cognition of which earth and
the like 22 are illusory modifications. ‘Others” are the
followers of the UpaniΣads. “What is the proof of this?”
The answer is given in the following Verse:
Verse 329
There is nothing in this world that is capable of being
apprehended.
All of this is held to be the illusory modification of
consciousness.23
Apart from cognition, earth and the like are not capable
of being apprehended. So they could appear as
composites. Atoms do not exist. So by implication it is
concluded that earth and the like are merely so many
reflections in consciousness. “This” in “All of this”
means “earth and the like.”

20

In the translation we do not distinguish a Self from a self, since it is not
distinguished in the text.

21

“A permanent cognition” is a translation of niyajñåna. Throughout the
examination of the Advaita theory of a self jñåna (“cognition”) and vijñåna
(“consciousness”) seem to be used as synonyms.

22

In our translation we avoid what is normally translated as “etc.” and instead
use “and the like,” “other such things,” and other similar locutions.

23

“Consciousness” is here and elsewhere a translation of vijñåna.
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Comments
If we use “things in this world” to represent “earth and the
like,” ÍåntarakΣita’s account of the Advaita theory of a self may be
reconstructed as follows: things in this world are not capable of
being apprehended, since they are illusory modifications of a
permanent or unchanging cognition. This permanent cognition,
according to the Advaitins themselves, is the Self, and that which it
apprehends is Itself, but apprehends Itself not as an object, only as
subject. So they think that the Self is a permanent non-dual
cognition of Itself, and since It is identical to Ultimate Reality, It is
also a permanent non-dual cognition of Ultimate Reality. It is this
cognition of which things in the world are illusory modifications.
ÍåntarakΣita, however, seems to assume that “self” (åtman) can
only in fact be used to refer to an illusory cognition of an object of
the sort that he himself accepts: an impermanent illusory cognition
of an object as separate in existence from the cognition, but which
does not in fact exist apart from its cognition.24 Consequently, he
will try to argue in what follows that the illusory cognition of an
object is in fact impermanent rather than permanent. Perhaps he is
appropriating the Advaitins use of “self” to refer to an
individualized ego that identifies itself with the body and mind,
since because of its identification its cognitions of objects will be
impermanent. In any case, he will be ignoring the Advaitins’
distinction between the Self and a self.
TRANSLATION
The above theory of the Vedåntin is contradicted in the
following Verse:
Verse 330
The error in the view of these philosophers is a slight one,
since only the assertion of permanence [is incorrect].
For difference is clearly perceived
in the cognitions of color, sound, and other things.
Verse 331
If all of these cognitions were one,
24

This is his acceptance of the Yogåcåra idealism as conventional reality.
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then color, sound, flavor and other such things
would be apprehended all at once,
since different states are impossible in a permanent
entity.
“The error is a slight one” means that they posit only
cognition, which is quite reasonable. “If that is so, then
what is the slight error in their view?” It is that they
assert permanence [of cognition] “But why should the
acceptance of [the] permanence [of cognition] be
unreasonable?” The answer is that difference is clearly
perceived and so on. Permanence implies always
remaining in the same state, and impermanence implies
not always remaining in the same state. In fact, the
cognition that manifests color, sound, and other things is
not always found to be in one and the same state.
Actually, it appears at one time to manifest color and at
another time to manifest sound, and so on in a certain
order of sequence. Under the circumstances, if all these
things, sound and the rest, were manifested by a single
permanent cognition, then all of them would appear
simultaneously, like a bedspread of different colors, since
the cognition manifesting them would always be there.
It may be claimed that the cognition of sound and other
things are different states appearing one after the other,
so that the apprehension of sound and the like could not
be simultaneous. In reply to this it is said that “Different
states in a permanent entity are impossible,” since the
states are not different from the entity to which they
belong. So the entity to which the states belong would be
liable to production and destruction, appearance and
disappearance, in the same way as the states are liable.
Or conversely, the states would also be permanent, like
the entity to which they belong. If on the other hand the
states are different from the entity to which they belong,
there can be no idea of the states belonging to this entity,
since there is no benefit conferred by the one on the other.
And this alternative would also be contrary to the doctrine
that permanent cognition is the only one entity there is.
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Comments
When ÍåntarakΣita says that the error in the Advaitins’ view
is a slight one, he seems to mean, first, that their view, that color,
flavor and other such things are illusory modifications of cognition,
is correct. He thinks that their view is correct if it expresses the
conventional truth that earth, fire, water and so on are illusory
modifications of impermanent cognition, but it is not true that they
are illusory modifications of permanent cognition. In Verses 130
and 131 he drops the qualification “illusory,” since even in his own
view objects in the world falsely appear to be external to cognition.
Kamalaß¥la expands ÍåntarakΣita’s objection to the
Advaitins’ theory that earth, fire, water and so on are modifications
of a permanent cognition. If we render “cognition that manifests
sound, color and the like” simply as “different cognitions,” the
objection to the view that earth, fire, water and so on are
modifications of a permanent cognition may be formulated as
follows: (i) if cognition is a permanent phenomenon, it always
remains in the same state; (ii) if cognition always remains in the
same state, different cognitions would always be present; (iii) if
different cognitions would always be present, then different
cognitions would appear simultaneously, like a bedspread of
different colors; (iv) different cognitions do not appear
simultaneously, like a bedspread of different colors; (v) so
cognition is not a permanent phenomenon.
Kamalaß¥la adds an objection to a reply. The reply is that
even though different cognitions cannot be simultaneous, they can
occur one after another. The intent of the reply is that the
modifications of a permanent cognition occur one after another
rather than simultaneously. Kamalaß¥la argues that at different
times different states in a permanent entity are impossible, since the
states are not different from the entity to which they belong, which
means either that the entity to which they belong would come to be
and pass away in the same way that its states would or that the
states would be permanent because the entity to which they belong
is permanent. Nor can the states be different from the entity to
which they belong, he says, since they would not then belong to the
entity, in which case they would not benefit the entity. The upshot,
he says, is that this alternative is contrary to the Advaita view that
permanent cognition, i.e. the Self, is the only entity there is.
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When the Advaitins claim, in Verse 328, that things in this
world are the “illusory” modification of a permanent cognition,
they may think that this qualification implies that the permanent
cognition is not really modified. The Advaita view is that it is only
the cognition of Ultimate Reality or the Self, the substratum of the
world of empirical objects, is permanent, not the cognition of
empirical objects. The Advaitins might claim that the objections of
ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la do not undermine their view because
they assume that illusory cognitions must be either other than or
the same as the permanent consciousness to which they belong,
which the Advaitins deny. In response to their claim, however,
ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la would argue that if it is denied that
illusory cognitions are either other than or the same as the
permanent consciousness to which they belong, they do not exist at
all, since what is neither other than nor the same as something else
does not exist at all.
TRANSLATION
Further, if a permanent consciousness were to exist, it
could be known either through perception or through
inference. That it cannot be known through perception is
shown in the following Verse:
Verse 332
Cognition or consciousness is never apprehended
that is other than the cognitions of color and the like.
And since these latter undergo variations every moment,
what remains there that could be lasting?
In fact, apart from the cognitions of color and the like,
which appear one after the other, we do not apprehend
any persisting consciousness, permanent and one,
whereby it could be claimed to be known through
perception. Then since it is well-known that the
cognitions of color and the like are apprehended one
after the other, and are destroyed every moment, it must
be explained what remains there that is not other than
those cognitions. So since there is no apprehension of
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any such cognition, which would be apprehended if it
were there, it cannot be considered otherwise than as
non-existent. This is what the Verse means.
Nor can it be claimed that the so-called permanent
cognition is known through inference. For such an
inference would be based either on the nature of the
cognition itself or on the nature of its effects. It cannot
be the former, since there is nothing that can prove that it
is the nature of the so-called permanent cognition. On
the contrary, perception itself precludes any such idea.
So the doctrine that the world is the illusory modification
of a permanent consciousness is not right.

Comments
The objection to the Advaita theory of a self in Verse 332
may be reconstructed as follows: (i) if the world is the illusory
modification of a permanent consciousness, a permanent
consciousness that is other than or the same as cognitions occurring
at different times can be perceived or correctly inferred to exist; (ii)
a permanent consciousness that is other than cognitions occurring
at different times cannot be perceived or correctly inferred to exist;
(iii) so if the world is the illusory modification of a permanent
consciousness, a permanent consciousness that is the same as
cognitions occurring at different times can be perceived or
correctly inferred to exist; (iv) a permanent consciousness that is
the same as cognitions occurring at different times cannot be
perceived; (v) if a permanent consciousness that is the same as
cognitions occurring at different times can be correctly inferred to
exist, the inference would be based either on the nature of
permanent consciousness itself or on the nature of effects produced
by permanent consciousness; (vi) if the inference is based on the
nature of permanent consciousness itself, it can be proved that
permanence is the nature of consciousness; (vii) it cannot be
proved that permanence is the nature of consciousness; (viii) if the
inference is based on the nature of effects produced by permanent
consciousness, there is perception of effects produced by
permanent consciousness; (ix) there is no perception of effects
produced by permanent consciousness; (x) so a permanent
consciousness that is the same as cognitions occurring at different
times is not correctly inferred to exist; (xi) so a permanent
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consciousness that is the same as cognitions occurring at different
times can be neither perceived nor correctly inferred to exist; (xii)
so the world is not the illusory modification of a permanent
consciousness.
But this objection, the Advaitins might say, does not pertain
to their theory of a self, since they claim that the permanent
consciousness is neither other than nor the same as its illusory
appearing cognitions occurring at different times. But here again,
ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la can reply that what is neither other
than nor the same as something else does not exist at all, in which
case a permanent consciousness that is neither other than nor the
same as its illusory appearing cognitions that occur at different
times does not exist at all.
TRANSLATION
Then again, according to this doctrine, [the use of] the
ideas of bondage and liberation is not possible. This is
what is shown in the following Verse:
Verse 333
There can be no distinction between wrong and right
cognition
if a self consists of a single cognition.
How can there be any bondage and liberation?
For one who holds the view that cognition is in perpetual
flux, different with different persons, undergoing
variations in a continuum, the idea of bondage and
liberation is quite reasonable, since it is due to the arising
of a continuum of cognitions, wrong and right
[respectively]. Through the practice of yoga, gradually
purer and purer cognitions arise, the continuum of
impure cognitions ceases and the final aim is attained. So
the attempt to become liberated from suffering becomes
fruitful. For you, on the other hand, a self is of the nature
of one permanent cognition. How then can there be any
bondage and liberation for such a self? For if the one
cognition is permanently wrong, there can be no

Published by DigitalCommons@Linfield, 2021

13

The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies, Vol. 21 [2021], Art. 3

48

The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 21, 2020

liberation, since there could be no other state for it. On
the other hand, if the one cognition were permanently
right, there could be no bondage, since it would be
always pure. According to our doctrine, cognition is held
to be impure or pure in agreement with the different
character of the continuum. So the idea of bondage and
liberation is entirely reasonable. This has been said;
“Cognition is impure or free from faults, beset with
impurities or 25 free from impurities. If it were never
impure, then all embodied beings would always be
liberated. If it were never pure, then the attempt to secure
liberation would be fruitless.”

Comments
The argument in Verse 333 may be reconstructed as follows:
(i) if the self is of the nature of one permanent consciousness, this
one permanent consciousness is contaminated or uncontaminated;
(ii) if this one permanent consciousness is contaminated, it is
always contaminated; (iii) if this one permanent consciousness is
always contaminated, there can be no liberation; (iv) if this one
permanent consciousness is uncontaminated, it is always uncontaminated; (v) if this one permanent consciousness is always
uncontaminated, there can be no bondage; (vi) so if the nature of
the self is one permanent consciousness, there can be no bondage
and liberation for the self; (vii) but if the nature of the self is to be a
continuum of impermanent consciousnesses, there are bondage and
liberation in dependence upon the character of the continuum.
Although the objection from the impossibility of bondage
and liberation rests on the assumption that the Advaitins attribute
bondage and liberation to the permanent Self, it is clear that they
do not do so. Consequently, it is not clear why ÍåntarakΣita and
Kamalaß¥la think that they do. Moreover, the Advaitins have a
simple reply to the objection from the impossibility of bondage and
liberation for the self: the problem their philosophy is meant to
solve is not that the Self is bound in cyclic existence, but that what
falsely appears to be the Self is bound in cyclic existence; the
solution to the problem is to realize that the real Self is not in fact
bound in cyclic existence. ÍåntarakΣita does not discuss such a reply.
25

Jha has “and” here, which makes little sense.
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TRANSLATION
If it is claimed that bondage and liberation are merely
conceptually constructed rather than real, it becomes
necessary to explain the basis of this conceptual
construction. It has been shown above what this basis is:
it is the theory that cognitions are impermanent. So [if
consciousness is a permanent phenomenon] the effort to
contemplate reality for the sake of the attainment of the
ultimate aim and for passing beyond the cycle of birth
and death can only lead to pointless exhaustion. This is
shown in the following Verses:
Verse 334
What could the yogi accomplish or not accomplish by
the practice of yoga?
What is also there that could be rejected? For wrong
cognition also has the same nature.
Verse 335
The knowledge of truth also cannot be brought about.
Since it is of the nature of cognition,
it is always there. So the entire practice of yoga is also
completely pointless.
If a yogi could accomplish or not accomplish something
by contemplating reality, his effort would be fruitful. As
it is, he can never set aside wrong cognition, since it has
the same nature, i.e. the nature of a permanent cognition.
For the same reason, it cannot be rejected, since what is
permanent cannot be destroyed. Therefore, its rejection is
impossible. How can a yogi accomplish or bring about
knowledge of reality? Since knowledge of reality is of
the nature of a permanent cognition, it would always be
there. So the theory in question cannot be right.

Comments
In Kamalaß¥la’s introductory commentary on Verses 334–
335 he presents a possible Advaita reply to the objection from the
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impossibility of bondage and liberation for the self. The reply
seems to be that even though the permanent self is said to be bound
and liberated, it is not really bound and liberated, since its bondage
and liberation are mentally constructed, and since its bondage and
liberation are mentally constructed, its bondage and liberation can
be attributed to the permanent self in spite of its bondage and
liberation being impossible. Kamalaß¥la’s objection to the reply is
to claim that the actual basis of the claim that bondage and
liberation are mentally constructed is the theory that cognitions are
impermanent. What he means by saying that cognitions are
impermanent is that consciousness is a continuum of impermanent
cognitions. So the full form of his objection is that it cannot be said
that bondage and liberation for a permanent consciousness are
mentally constructed, since the basis of the mental construction of
bondage and liberation is the theory that consciousness is a continuum of impermanent cognitions. Kamalaß¥la concludes that in
Verses 334–335 ÍåntarakΣita argues that if consciousness is a
permanent phenomenon the effort to contemplate reality for the
sake of liberation can only lead to pointless exhaustion.
The reply from the mental construction of bondage and
liberation is surely not a reply the Advaitins would give to the
objection from the impossibility of bondage and liberation, since
they do not claim that a permanent Self suffers in saµsåra and is
liberated.
The objection in Verses 334–335 is that if cognition or the
self is permanent, the attempt to use yoga to contemplate ultimate
reality for the sake of liberation of the self can only lead to pointless exhaustion. Since yoga accomplishes its goals by rejecting
falsecognitions, there must be false cognitions to reject. But if there
is only one cognition and it is permanent, false cognition cannot be
rejected, because to reject a false cognition is to destroy it, and what
is permanent cannot be destroyed. Thus yoga cannot be fruitful.
This objection once again misses the mark, since the
liberation of a permanent self is not a view held by the Advaitins.
Final Comment
It cannot be said that ÍåntarakΣita and Kamalaß¥la have
conclusively refuted the Advaita theory of a self, since they fail to
consider the most likely Advaitin replies to their objections. Most
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importantly, they do not consider the reply that different cognitions
of objects are themselves illusory modifications, not real
modifications, of a permanent cognition.
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